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Commodity or Propriety? Unauthorised Transfer
of Intangible Entitlements in the EU Emissions
Trading System
Bonnie Holligan∗
This article argues that the law governing transfer of allowances within the EUEmissions Trading
System (EU ETS) should place greater weight upon transactional (and environmental) integrity,
even over market liquidity. More broadly, it reflects on the role played by registries in sharing
or concealing information about the material world. Although property rules enable market
activity through the creation of an abstract carbon commodity, they must also link past to future
entitlements in a just way. In emissions tradingmarkets, justice in private transactions is intimately
connected to public questions of environmental justice. The relevant EU Regulation prioritises
facility of transfer over protection of existing holders, insulating registered entitlements from
prior proprietary claims. This approach ignores the important connections between history,
integrity and responsibility in both public and private spheres. A preferable response would be
to distinguish between transactional and register error, protecting against register mistakes, but
not transactional defects.
INTRODUCTION
Emissions trading schemes inhabit an uneasy position between public and
private law. Approached as markets, their foundations are the private law in-
stitutions of contract and property, but their role in allocating environmental
responsibility raises public concerns around environmental integrity, adminis-
trative legitimacy and social and environmental justice. The process by which
carbon and other pollutants are commodified1 presents many questions for
property scholars; this article considers allowances created under the EU Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS)2 as, at least in the understanding of English
law, a novel form of intangible property. Drawing on perspectives from prop-
erty theory and doctrine, as well as critical geographical scholarship, it claims
that the public dimensions of emissions trading necessitate a conceptual shift
∗Lecturer in Property Law, University of Sussex. I am grateful to Professor Alison Clarke and Professor
Donald McGillivray for their comments on earlier versions of this piece, to the organisers of the
Modern Studies in Property Law Publication Workshop held at Queens’ College, Cambridge in
April 2017 and to the anonymous peer reviewers for their comments. All errors are my own. Unless
otherwise stated, all URLs were last accessed 21 January 2020.
1 The concept of ‘commodification’ is used here in the Marxian sense detailed by N. Castree,
‘Commodifying What Nature?’ (2003) 27 Progress in Human Geography 273.
2 The EU ETS was created under Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC
OJ L 275/32 (Emissions Trading Directive).
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in doctrinal norms and values. In particular, the rules governing transfer of
allowances must foster not only justice between individual market participants,
but also political and ecological accountability.
The article is part of a growing body of research analysing the role of property
in emissions trading markets.3 It explores some of the normative contradictions
that transfer rules must manage, in particular the perceived tension between
market liquidity and environmental and transactional integrity. The current le-
gal construction of allowances as fungible property that must circulate without
restriction is a fragile edifice that often operates to obscure conflict rather than
resolve it. Questions of territory and sovereignty constantly threaten the legal
homogeneity of allowances, for example in the negotiations around the depar-
ture of the United Kingdom from the European Union.4 Moreover, intangible
property rights such as emissions allowances cannot be understood separately
from the technologies that create and record them; the design of electronic
registration systems is closely connected to legal paradigms of transfer.5 As pro-
cesses of market exchange compress space and time, the article points to the
importance of maintaining property rules that recognise, rather than suppress,
the connection with the human and material.
The EU ETS has its origins in a more general policy shift towards the
use of market mechanisms to solve environmental problems such as climate
change.6 The construction of new forms of property right plays a critical
role in the establishment of successful trading schemes.7 Notwithstanding the
legislative silence regarding the legal nature of emissions allowances in the
EU ETS (EUAs), it appears meaningful, in the English context at least, to
talk of entitlement to EUAs as being proprietary in nature. Discussion in the
article centres on reforms made in 2011 to the registration of allowances that
prioritise facility of transfer over protection of existing holders. These reforms,
it is argued, protect the homogeneity of allowances at the expense of values
3 See in particular K.F.K. Low and J. Lin, ‘Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity,
TragiCO2medy?’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 377; S. Manea, The Instrumentalization
of Property: Legal Interests in the EU Emissions Trading System (The Hague: Wolters Kluwer, 2014)
and C. Godt (ed), Regulatory Property Rights: The Transforming Notion of Property in Transnational
Business Regulation (Leiden: Brill, 2016) esp chs 1 and 2 by C. Godt and M. Colangelo.
4 Preparations have included plans to distinguish allowances originating in the United Kingdom
from other allowances if not surrendered before the exit date: Commission Regulation (EU)
2018/208 of 12 February 2018 amending Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 establishing a Union
Registry and The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (Amendment) Regulations 2017,
SI 2017/1207. From April 2019, the UK has been unable to issue allowances: Commission De-
cision of 17 December 2018 on instructing the central administrator to temporarily suspend the
acceptance by the European Union Transaction Log of relevant processes for the United King-
dom relating to free allocation, auctioning and the exchange of international credits (C(2018)
8707).
5 The risk of ‘governance by algorithm’ displacing property norms has been highlighted, in a
different context, by P. Paech, ‘Securities, intermediation and the blockchain: an inevitable
choice between liquidity and legal certainty?’ (2016) 21 Uniform Law Review 612.
6 For analysis of these shifts in regulatory approaches and actors, see N. Gunningham, ‘Environ-
ment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental
Law 179; C.T. Reid and W. Nsoh, The Privatisation of Biodiversity? New Approaches to Nature Con-
servation Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016) ch 1.
7 See for example Reid and Nsoh, ibid, para 2.9; Manea, n 3 above, ch 6.
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connected with historically-derived integrity and responsibility in both public
and private spheres.
The relevant EU Regulation (the Registry Regulation),8 was adopted to
shore up the emissions trading market, confidence in which had been affected
by serious instances of fraud and electronic theft9 of allowances.10 Although
allowances are explicitly stated by the Regulation to be fungible,11 legal equiv-
alence can only mask imperfectly the material and political dimensions that
continue to be associated with the regulation of carbon pollution. The use of
market mechanisms to allocate environmental responsibility entails that private
law questions of entitlement to allowances are inextricably linked to public
questions of liability for carbon emissions; integrity in market transactions is,
on some level, connected to environmental effectiveness.
The doctrinal implication of this perspective is that protection of good faith
acquirers requires different justifications to those accepted in other contexts.
Acknowledging the interpenetration of public and private responsibility ne-
cessitates a rebalancing away from abstraction and towards transparency. The
article contends that suppression of historical, property-based claims to al-
lowances should not be used to mask structural deficits in trading governance.
Particularly given the risks associated with an entirely electronic system of
transfer, it is argued that conferring an immediately indefeasible entitlement to
an allowance on registration is not justified, although allowing entitlements to
become indefeasible on some later event such as valid transfer to a third party
(deferred indefeasibility) may be.12
It is concluded that, despite the ultimately limited ability of transfer rules to
address many of the contradictions inherent in emissions trading, their function
is more complex than is suggested by the Registry Regulation. Although
property rights enable market activity, they achieve this by linking past to
future entitlements in a just way. Abstraction and fungibility of allowances can
therefore never be total or complete.
8 Initial changes were made in Regulation (EU) No 1193/2011, but this was later repealed. See
now Commission Regulation 389/2013/EU of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions
No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 1193/2011 [2013] OJ L122/1
(Registry Regulation).
9 In English law at least, it is meaningful to refer to ‘theft’ of intangibles. For the purposes of the
Theft Act 1968, ‘property’ extends to ‘things in action and other intangible property’ (Theft
Act 1968, s 4(1)).
10 See K. Nield and R. Pereira, ‘Financial crimes in the European carbon markets’ in S.E. Weishaar
and E. Woerdman, Research Handbook on Emissions Trading (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016)
195, 206-208. See further sources at nn 39-41 below.
11 Registry Regulation, Art 40(1).
12 This term is more frequently used in the context of title-based land registration systems on
the ‘Torrens’ model, such as that in Australia; see P. O’Connor, ‘Deferred and Immediate
Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity’ (2009) 13 Edinburgh Law Review 194.
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EU EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES AS INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
Context: market allocation of pollution opportunities
Launched in 2005,13 the EU ETS aims to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions through the creation of an ‘efficient European market in greenhouse
gas emission allowances’,14 each allowance representing one tonne of carbon
dioxide equivalent.15 It is argued in this section that this has given rise to a form
of entitlement that can meaningfully be understood as ‘property’. Emissions
reductions are achieved through the imposition of a cap on the total tonnes
of CO2 equivalent (tCO2-e) that can be emitted by regulated entities during
a compliance period.16 Operators of relevant ‘installations’,17 broadly those
which involve high-energy operations such as power plants with a thermal
input of over 20MW, metal processing facilities or oil refineries, have their
emissions monitored and are required to surrender a corresponding number of
allowances each year or to pay a financial penalty.18 The cap is now set at EU
level, with each member state determining the allocation of allowances within
its jurisdiction.19 In 2012 the scheme was extended to cover aviation emissions
within the EEA, with plans for further expansion.20
The legal structures governing transfer of allowances are embedded within a
burgeoning theoretical and policy discourse around emissions trading markets
and their role in environmental governance. A fundamental premise of such
trading schemes is that trade in pollution authorisations or exemptions21 will
allow individual polluters to select the optimum balance between reducing
emissions and purchasing permits at market value. This is portrayed as a more
efficient way of allocating pollution opportunities than regulation by a central
or state body.22 Initially, EU ETS allowances are distributed through either free
13 See Emissions Trading Directive. On the history of the EU ETS and emissions trading, see D.
Freestone and C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond
(Oxford: OUP, 2009) esp ch 16 by M. Pohlmann, ‘The EU Emissions Trading Scheme’.
14 See Emissions Trading Directive.
15 Emissions Trading Directive, Art 3(a).
16 For 2019, the cap for non-aviation emissions was 1,854,716,381 tonnes of CO2e. See Commis-
sion Decision 2010/384/EU of 9 July 2010 on the Community-wide quantity of allowances to
be issued under the EU Emission Trading Scheme for 2013 (notified under document C(2010)
4658 OJ L 175/36) and Emissions Trading Directive, Art 9.
17 For the definition of ‘installation’, see Emissions Trading Directive, Art 3h and Annex 1.
18 See Emissions Trading Directive, Arts 6 and 16.
19 Emissions Trading Directive, Art 9.
20 See Emissions Trading Directive, Ch II and Commission policies at https://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/transport/aviation_en.
21 On a Hohfeldian analysis, a distinction can be drawn between a ‘right to pollute’, for example
a proprietary entitlement to emit a certain quantity of pollution, and an exemption from a
penalty. See Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch) at [48]
(Armstrong).
22 A classic summary of this argument is given by J.H. Dale, Property and Prices: An Essay in
Policy-Making and Economics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968) ch 6.
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allocation or auctioning.23 In order to meet its obligations under the scheme, an
operator may subsequently acquire or transfer allowances on the open market.24
To engage in trading, one is not required to be the operator of an instal-
lation; voluntary activity by traders and brokers expands and deepens market
participation.25 Many transactions involve trading in derivatives (futures, for-
wards, options, swaps) rather than direct buying or selling of allowances.26 The
development of this secondary market is seen as crucial to the effective func-
tioning of carbon markets, as, at least according to orthodox economic theory,
the greater the volume and frequency of transactions, the more efficient the
market will be at setting the appropriate pollution price.27 The majority of
secondary trading now takes place via exchanges.28 Under the second Markets
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID2) all trades in emissions allowances
are now regulated in the same way as those involving financial instruments.29
This provides for various types of scrutiny over the activities of traders, poten-
tially reducing the risk of unauthorised transfer, but does not, in itself, affect
any property rules that might apply to allowances.30
A fundamental distinction can be drawn between EUAs, which are predi-
cated on the existence of EU limits on emissions31 and are distributed initially
through state auctioning or allocation, and offset-based emissions credits, which
23 Commission policy is to move towards auctioning of all allowances, but under transitional
provisions in place until 2020 around 43 per cent of allowances will continue to be allocated
for free under harmonised rules set out in the Emissions Trading Directive, Arts 10-10c. See
European Commission, Report on the functioning of the European carbon market COM(2019) 557
final, 13-25.
24 See Emissions Trading Directive, Art 12.
25 Emissions Trading Directive, Art 19(2). See Registry Regulation, Art 18 for the procedure
regarding the opening of a ‘person holding and trading account’.
26 For discussion of secondary trading activity and indicative statistics, see Europe Economics report
for European Commission, Interplay between EU ETS Registry and Post Trade Infrastructure (2015)
113-130.
27 On the complementary relationship between primary and secondary markets, see A. Hedges,
‘The Secondary Market for Emissions Trading: Balancing Market Design and Market Based
Transaction Norms’ in Freestone and Streck (eds), n 13 above, 310, 332-333. On whether ‘thin’
trading is a sign of market inefficiency, see B. Hintermann et al, ‘Price and Market Behavior in
Phase II of the EU ETS: A Review of the Literature’ (2016) 10 Review of Environmental Economics
and Policy 108, 118-119.
28 On the move away from more specialised contracting via brokers, see Europe Economics report
for European Commission, n 26 above, 20.
29 See Annex 1 to Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and
Directive 2011/61/EU (recast) OJ L 173/349 (MiFID 2 Directive). Some activities are, or may
be, exempted from the scope of the directive, see Arts 2 and 3.
30 No provision is made in the MiFID 2 directive as to ownership of traded assets. For information
about Commission policy in this area, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/
banking-and-finance/financial-markets/securities-markets/investment-services-and-regulated-
markets-markets-financial-instruments-directive-mifid_en. See also K. Gorzelak, ‘The legal
nature of emission allowances following the creation of a Union Registry and adoption of
MiFID II – are they transferable securities now?’ (2014) 9 Capital Markets Law Journal 373,
385-386.
31 See Emissions Trading Directive, Arts 6 and 16.
C© 2020 The Author. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2020) 00(0) MLR 1–29 5
Commodity or Propriety?
are generated through carbon reduction activities.32 The EU ETS allows par-
ticipants to use credits from two UN programmes initiated as part of the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), in
fulfilment of their compliance obligations.33 The credits created through these
schemes are known as Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) and Emissions
Reduction Units (ERUs) respectively, and they may be registered in the Union
Registry.34 Subject to some restrictions on eligibility and quantity, CERs and
ERUs may be exchanged for EUAs.35 The inclusion of these offsets in the
EU ETS has been one of its most controversial aspects.36 Until 2020, 50 per
cent of the emissions reductions generated by the EU ETS are permitted to
come from the surrender of EUAs converted from offset-based credits, which
implicitly reduces demand for allowances distributed by member states.37
Despite some evidence of positive impacts on carbon emissions and techno-
logical innovation, the market in EUAs has functioned imperfectly.38 The EU
ETS has been linked to extensive and various criminal activities, ranging from
VAT fraud to theft of emissions allowances.39 There have also been problems
with the additionality of projects, and difficulties associated with the linking of
the EU ETS to international emissions trading schemes, such as ‘recycling’ of
allowances already surrendered in other schemes.40 As a result, the Commission
32 As well as being necessary for conceptual clarity, this distinction may also have important
commercial consequences: see Ineos Manufacturing Scotland Ltd v Grangemouth CHP Ltd [2011]
EWHC 163 (Comm) (Ineos).
33 For comparison of the legal nature of Kyoto credits and EUAs, see M. Wemaere, C. Streck and
T. Chagas, ‘Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and EU Allowances’ in Freestone and
Streck, n 13 above, 35.
34 See Annex 1 to the Registry Regulation for a list of which account types can hold which types
of credit.
35 See Registry Regulation, Art 60.
36 See sources at nn 40-42 below and Sandbag Climate Campaign, Help or Hindrance? Offsetting in
the EU ETS (2012).
37 For example, the volume of CERs that can be used is equivalent to 50 per cent of the annual
reduction in the EU-level cap. See Emissions Trading Directive, Art 11a.
38 For a review of the literature on impacts, see R. Martin, M. Muuˆls and U.J. Wagner, ‘The
Impact of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme on Regulated Firms: What Is the
Evidence after Ten Years?’ (2016) 10 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 129. For an
overview of criticism, see F. Branger et al, ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme:
should we throw the flagship out with the bathwater?’ (2015) 6 WIREs Climate Change 9.
39 For a typology of the various types of fraudulent behaviours that have affected carbon markets,
see P. Martin and R. Walters, ‘Fraud Risk and the Visibility of Carbon’ (2013) 2 International
Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 27, 30. See also M-C. Frunza, Fraud and Carbon
Markets: The Carbon Connection (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) and Interpol, Guide to Carbon
Trading Crime (2013).
40 Deutsche Bank AG v Total Global Steel Ltd [2012] EWHC 1201 (Comm) (Deutsche Bank) is one
example of litigation arising from the sale of previously surrendered credits. The events giving
rise to a 2010 scandal over the use of such credits are described at paras 26-36 of the judgment.
See also Carbon Market Institute, Integrity and Oversight of the European Union Emissions Trading
System (2012) ch 6.
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has made various legislative and policy changes to address these risks,41 and the
use of linking credits has been restricted (but not ended entirely).42
Proprietary status of allowances
Determining the legal status of intangible permissions such as emissions al-
lowances raises deep questions regarding the scope of ‘property’, to which it
is difficult to provide a uniform answer across jurisdictions. Although English
law appears willing to accept allowances as, in its terms, intangible property,
the relevant EU legislation is silent on the matter. According to the Emissions
Trading Directive:
‘allowance’ means an allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent
during a specified period, which shall be valid only for the purposes of meeting
the requirements of this Directive and shall be transferable in accordance with the
provisions of this Directive.43
The Union Registry provides an electronic record of the existence of and (in
the words of the English language version of the Registry Regulation) ‘title
over’ allowances, which have no material form.44 More precise definition of
the legal status of allowances is left to member states.45
From the perspective of English law, the proprietary status of allowances
does not appear especially controversial. The High Court has, in Armstrong
DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd46 (Armstrong), recognised entitlement
to allowances as a form of intangible property. As an EUA is not claimed or
enforced through legal action, it was classified as a form of ‘other intangi-
ble property’ rather than a chose in action.47 Two (possibly complementary)
lines of reasoning were put forward by Stephen Morris QC48 to justify this
conclusion. Reference was first made to the, perhaps somewhat circular, prin-
41 See European Court of Auditors, The integrity and implementation of the EU ETS (2015) 19-20.
42 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 1123/2013 of 8 November 2013 on determining inter-
national credit entitlements pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council, OJ L 299/32 and Emissions Trading Directive, Art 11b.
43 Emissions Trading Directive, Art 3(a).
44 See Registry Regulation, Art 40(2). The terminology used in the Registry Regulation is not
necessarily consistent between jurisdictions: for example, the German version of Art 40(2) refers
to Besitzrecht, which can be literally translated as ‘right to possess’. This is presumably to avoid
the, potentially controversial, suggestion that an incorporeal thing such as an EUA could be an
object of eigentum (ownership).
45 On the history of this decision, see Low and Lin, n 3 above, 381-382. For an overview of
the legal treatment of allowances in various member states, see member state responses submit-
ted to the Commission under Directive 2003/87/EC, Art 21 at http://www.eea.europa.eu/
data-and-maps/data/application-of-the-emissions-trading.
46 n 21 above. For discussion of the case, see Low and Lin, n 3 above, and D. Sheehan, ‘Bona
Fide Purchase, Knowing Receipt and Proprietary Claims to Land and Carbon Credits’ (2013)
24 King’s Law Journal 424.
47 Armstrong n 21 above at [61].
48 Sitting as a deputy High Court judge.
C© 2020 The Author. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2020) 00(0) MLR 1–29 7
Commodity or Propriety?
ciples put forward by LordWilberforce inNational Provincial Bank v Ainsworth49
(Ainsworth). According to this widely-cited summation, the hallmarks of a pro-
prietary right are that it is ‘definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its
nature of assumption by third parties, and [has] some degree of permanence or
stability’.50
On this basis, although it ‘represents at most a permission (or liberty in the
Hohfeldian sense) or an exemption from a prohibition or fine’,51 an EUA was
argued to be definable as ‘the sum total of rights and entitlements conferred on
the holder pursuant to the ETS’.52 EUAs are transferable under the EU ETS
rules (indeed, their transferability is crucial to the establishment of a functioning
market). Finally, each allowance has a unique code.53 This allows for identi-
fication and contributes to the permanence and stability of the allowance.54
The serial number is argued below to connote a distinct history and identity;
in this respect, an allowance resembles corporeal money such as a banknote
more closely than an entry in a bank account ledger (whether electronic or
otherwise).
Given the relative openness of English law to recognising property rights in
a variety of incorporeal things,55 it is reasonable to suppose that similar conclu-
sions will be reached in future English litigation. The characteristic flexibility
of English law is illustrated in the close attention paid to In re Celtic Extrac-
tion Ltd56 (a case involving waste management licenses). According to Stephen
Morris QC’s interpretation of this judgment, a statutory entitlement that is
transferable and has value is certainly ‘property’.57 This represents a compar-
atively expansive understanding of ‘property’ as being a quality that is closely
connected to financial value. Insofar as it affords legal certainty and rewards
market participation, such an approach has attractions for both regulators and
participants in emissions trading, particularly in a context where allowances are
distributed by auction.58 The construction of new types of property right may
be perceived here as a bulwark against state power.59 The recognition that al-
lowances represent significant resources is consistent with their characterisation
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Holcim (Romania)
SA v Commission (Holcim) as ‘instruments that can belong to the assets of . . .
natural and legal persons’.60 Although other private law institutions such as
49 [1965] AC 1175. See Armstrong n 21 above at [50]. For a critique of the approach in Ainsworth,
see K. Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 CLJ 252, 292-293.
50 Ainsworth ibid, 1248.
51 Armstrong n 21 above at [48].
52 ibid at [50].
53 Registry Regulation, Art 41(3).
54 See Armstrong n 21 above at [50].
55 For example, M. Bridge et al (eds), The Law of Personal Property (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
2nd ed, 2017) covers a variety of intangible things including intellectual property rights such as
trademarks.
56 [2001] Ch 475.
57 Armstrong n 21 above at [57].
58 A point noted by C. Streck and M. von Unger, ‘Creating, Regulating and Allocating Rights
to Offset and Pollute: Carbon Rights in Practice’ (2016) 3 Carbon and Climate Law Review 178,
185.
59 See for example C.A. Reich, ‘The New Property’ (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 733.
60 EU:C:2016:207 at [64].
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contract may be able to resolve certain questions,61 property has a valuable
ability to match entitlements to particular persons.62
Armstrong, if followed, goes some way towards clarifying a number of the
doctrinal questions raised by the trade in EU allowances in English law. Some
uncertainty remains, however, for property lawyers regarding the implications
of the transfer rules set out in the Registry Regulation, discussed below. There
is also the question of the variance in theoretical and doctrinal perspectives on
the nature of allowances across jurisdictions.63 As a result of concern over these
ambiguities, in 2016–2017 the European Commission funded a study on the
legal nature of EU allowances, although it is not clear what the outcomes of
this work have been.64
A new kind of entitlement?
A fundamental ambivalence remains, in addition, regarding the function of
Armstrong-type property claims. Is the liberal model of property as the guardian
of private interest adequate in the emissions trading context? While it is beyond
the scope of this article to consider fully the extent to which statutorily-created
entitlements differ from ‘natural’ property rights in corporeal things,65 it is
argued below that emissions trading regimes combine private and public values
in a particular way. Although the analysis presented does not depend on a theory
regarding the nature of ‘regulatory’ property rights,66 it does emphasise the close
link between public policy objectives and property rules. The internal logic of
the property regime created under the EU ETS is not reducible to the scheme’s
policy aims, but neither can the two be separated cleanly. As Manea argues,
property here exists in an ‘instrumental’ context in which trading norms must
serve a number of competing public and private interests.67 The combination
of environmental and commercial purposes distinguishes emissions allowances
from other types of intangible entitlement such as intellectual property rights
and milk quotas.68
In other pollution trading schemes, there has been a reluctance to recognise
the credits or allowances generated as property.69 At least part of the reason
61 See for example Ineos n 32 above; Deutsche Bank n 40 above.
62 An argument made by C. Michelon, ‘What Has Private Law Ever Done for Justice?’ (2018) 22
Edinburgh Law Review 329.
63 On the differing approaches to transfer between member states, see C. Godt, ‘Regulatory
Property Rights – A Challenge to Property Theory’ in Godt (ed), n 3 above, 13, 33-35 and, on
conflict of law issues, M. Appel and A. Burghardt, ‘Phishing of European Emission Allowances
and Resulting Legal Implications’ (2012) 3 Carbon and Climate Law Review 228.
64 This study was carried out by the law and policy consultancy Milieu. See https://www.milieu.
be/portfolio/climate-change/#1564748054830-57fac068-d996.
65 On debates surrounding the nature of ‘regulatory’ property rights, see for example Godt (ed),
n 3 above; Manea, n 3 above, esp ch 6; K. Gray, ‘Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of
Quasi-Public Trust’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 237.
66 See sources ibid.
67 Manea, n 3 above, 155-156.
68 For more detailed analysis on this point, see ibid, ch 5.
69 For discussion and further references, see Reid and Nsoh, n 6 above, 57-58; Manea, ibid, 20-26
and ch 2.
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for this appears to be a fear that to afford such entitlements proprietary status
would restrict the ability of states to regulate or confiscate them without com-
pensation.70 This issue came to the fore in ArcelorMittal Rodange et Schifflange
SA v Luxembourg71 (ArcelorMittal), which concerned the involuntary surrender
of allowances that had been allocated gratuitously to ArcelorMittal in respect
of an installation that had ceased operation. While implicitly accepting that al-
lowances could form part of a person’s ‘possessions’ for the purposes of Article
17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Court
of Justice held that no expropriation had taken place. Improperly allocated al-
lowances were not ‘allowances’ at all for the purposes of Directive 2003/87/EC
and therefore did not constitute an ‘asset’ that formed part of ArcelorMittal’s
property.72
This decision raises some awkward questions around the status of such invalid
allowances. If they had been sold to an unsuspecting buyer, would they continue
to be susceptible to confiscation? If, as discussed in the next section, stolen
allowances may be validly acquired in good faith, would the same apply to those
that had been issued by a state as a result of fraud or mistake? How important is
the ability of allowances to circulate freely? Fox argues that improperly issued
corporeal money should gain the status of currency if received as a medium of
exchange.73 Should a similar property regime apply to allowances? The issue
of fungibility is explored further below, but the political dynamics of emissions
trading markets undoubtedly shape the doctrinal approach adopted.
Implicit in Armstrong and ArcelorMittal is an understanding of property rights
as being primarily concerned with control over access to resources, rather than
the number of persons against whom a right is exigible.74 As Thomas Grey
argues, when property is considered as a matter of competing entitlements
to a variety of tangible and intangible resources ‘the neutrality of the state as
enforcer of private law evaporates’.75 In the emissions-trading context, it is
particularly apparent that private entitlements cannot pre-empt the need for
political debate regarding the allocation of the costs and benefits of climate
action. The next sections assert that the environmental aims of the EU ETS do
distinguish EUAs from other types of incorporeal property; this adds a number
of extra dimensions to the choice of transfer regime.
70 See Reid and Nsoh, ibid; S. Manea, ‘Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the
EU Emissions Trading System’ (2012) 1 Transnational Environmental Law 303, 309-310 and M.W.
Gehring and C. Streck, ‘Emissions Trading: Lessons From SOx and NOx Emissions Allowance
and Credit Systems: Legal Nature, Title, Transfer, and Taxation of Emission Allowances and
Credits’ (2005) 35 Environmental Law Reporter 10219, 10221-10224.
71 EU:C:2017:179.
72 ibid.
73 D. Fox, Property Rights in Money (Oxford: OUP, 2008) para 1.71.
74 On this argument see further Gray, n 49 above, 294; Low and Lin, n 3 above, 387-389; Manea, n
3 above, ch 4; and, for an argument regarding the limits of property in deciding public questions
of resource allocation, B. Barton, ‘Property Rights Created under Statute in Common Law
Legal Systems’ in A. McHarg et al, Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford:
OUP, 2010) 80.
75 T.C. Grey, ‘The Disintegration of Property’ (1980) 22 Nomos 69, 79.
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CREATING COMMODITY: TRANSFER RULES IN THE REGISTRY
REGULATION
A ‘commercial logic’
Trade in allowances is based on the idea of commensurability of carbon emis-
sions across space and time; in this respect, emissions allowances function in a
similar way to currency.76 Analysis in this section is founded on the premise
that the commodity status of allowances, like that of money, does not arise
naturally, but is produced and maintained through legal and political action.77
The relevant question is not simply whether two quantities are fungible, but
which non-fungibilities matter.78 The transfer rules set out in the Registry
Regulation are implicated in this process in two important ways. They seek to
maintain the nominal value of allowances, playing a role in the generation of
what Fox describes as the ‘perfect homogeneity which characterizes an ideal
form of money’.79 Linked to this is the desire to facilitate transfer and increase
market liquidity. The greater the extent to which an environmental ‘currency’
facilitates comparative valuation of previously incommensurable things, the
more liquid the market that will be created.80 The internal dynamics of the
commodity form inspire a drive towards acceleration and compression, ever
faster circulation becoming the aim of the emissions trading market.81
It is argued below that these aims structure and infuse the property princi-
ples introduced in the Registry Regulation. Legal homogeneity is produced
through the erasure of defects in title and the preclusion of claims that might
attach to specific allowances. Equality between allowances must be maintained,
regardless of origin or transaction history. The characterisation of emissions
trading systems as reflecting, as the CJEU have recently put it, a ‘commercial
logic’,82 is understood to support a preference for ‘dynamic’ over ‘static’ secu-
rity.83 In the context of unauthorised transfer of allowances, this favours the
protection of acquirers, regardless of any defect in the transferor’s entitlement.
76 A comparison drawn on by, for example, J.P. Descheneau, ‘The currencies of carbon: carbon
money and its social meaning’ (2012) 21 Environmental Politics 604; J. Salzman and J. B. Ruhl,
‘Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law’ (2000) 53 Stanford Law Review
607 and J. Button, ‘Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon
Market Based on the Currency Model’ (2008) 32 Harvard Environmental Law Review 571.
77 See C. Desan,Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism (Oxford: OUP, 2014).
The state’s role here is not uncontroversial, see C. Proctor, C. Kleiner and F. Mohs, Mann on the
Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford: OUP, 7th ed, 2012) paras 1.17-1.45.
78 As Salzman and Ruhl argue, this is implicitly a political decision: Salzman and Ruhl, n 76 above,
631. Compare NOx trading schemes in the United States, in which NOx gases are understood
as local pollutants: Gehring and Streck, n 70 above, 10227.
79 Fox, n 73 above, para 2.47.
80 Salzman and Ruhl refer to a distinction between ‘fat and sloppy’ and ‘thin and bland’ markets,
n 76 above, 646.
81 An argument made by J. Knox-Hayes, ‘The spatial and temporal dynamics of value in financial-
ization: Analysis of the infrastructure of carbon markets’ (2013) 50 Geoforum 117, 120.
82 Holcim n 60 above at [64]. See also ArcelorMittal n 71 above at [22].
83 Low and Lin, n 3 above, 384.
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Negative effect of registration
The only evidence as to the distribution of rights over allowances is located in
what is now a central electronic record, the Union Registry.84 Article 19(1)
of Directive 2003/87/EC requires that all allowances issued from 1 January
2012 onwards should be held in the Registry on accounts managed by the
Member States.85 An independent transaction log, the European Union Trans-
action Log (EUTL), is established to record the issue, transfer and cancellation
of allowances.86 What relevance does this have for acquisition and transfer of
entitlements? As Low and Lin point out, it is important to distinguish clearly
between the existence of a right and the presence of a record;87 sometimes sys-
tems of registration will have a constitutive (or ‘positive’) effect but not always.88
For example, the recording of a payment in a bank account ledger does not, in
itself, create an enforceable liability on the part of the recipient’s bank.89 The
distinction turns on whether registration actually creates the right concerned
(a positive system), or merely publicises a right that has arisen as a result of ac-
tions outside of the registry record (in which case registration has only negative
effect). It is argued below that the most plausible interpretation of the Registry
Regulation is that registration in the Union Registry has negative effect.
In accordance with the approach outlined earlier to determination of the
legal nature of allowances, in those jurisdictions in which allowances are con-
sidered to be the object of property rights,90 entitlements to allowances will
be governed by national law. Allowances are considered to be situated in the
territory of the Member State of the national account administrator.91 It is
beyond the scope of this article to investigate the international private law
implications of these provisions, but the creation of an EU-wide register of
property rights that nevertheless leaves the background rules of property law
to individual member states has the potential to raise complex conflict of law
issues.92
84 See Registry Regulation, Arts 4(1) and (2).
85 This change was provided for in Commission Regulation (EU) No 920/2010 of 7 October
2010 for a standardised and secured system of registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council OJ L 270/1.
86 Emissions Trading Directive, Art 20.
87 Low and Lin, n 3 above, 391.
88 On the distinction between positive and negative systems of registration, see Scottish Law
Commission, Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (DP no 125, 2004) para 1.9.
89 See Fox, n 73 above, paras 5.60-5.63.
90 For an overview of the legal treatment of allowances in various member states, see Art 21
reports, n 45 above. A number of member states did not provide information, or stated that
legal treatment of EUAs was in the process of amendment; it is not, therefore, possible to state
with certainty how far EUAs are recognised as property in other jurisdictions. On debates in
Germany, see Godt, n 63 above, 33-35.
91 Registry Regulation, Art 11(5).
92 A point raised by Joanna Perkins on behalf of the Financial Markets Law Committee, Letter
to DG Environment, European Commission re Commission Regulation establishing a Union Registry
in connection with the Union emissions trading scheme (5 January 2012) 3 at http://web.archive.
org/web/20170108031100/http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/issue116_let
ter_to_slingenberg_european_commission.pdf. See also P. Zaman, ‘The new Registries
Regulation – form over substance?’ in International Emissions Trading Association, IETA
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The Registry records entitlements both to international credits and to EUAs;
different types of registry account may hold different types of Kyoto entitle-
ments and EU allowances.93 Given the unique identifying number associated
with each allowance and the fact that the Emissions Trading Directive appears
to provide for the ‘transfer’ of allowances, Low and Lin make a cogent argu-
ment that the movement of an allowance from one account to another should
be understood as a genuine transfer of entitlement rather than the substitution
of one obligation for another.94 Does the act of registration, however, function
to create rights?
The dematerialised nature of allowances is cited by the European Com-
mission as justification for its position that entries in the Union Registry are
certainly evidence of right: ‘the title to an allowance or Kyoto unit should
be established by their existence in the account of the Union Registry in
which they are held.’95 As to whether this evidence is conclusive, the Registry
Regulation provides that ‘the record of the Union Registry shall constitute
prima facie and sufficient evidence of title over an allowance or Kyoto unit’.96
The Financial Markets Law Committee point out that this provision could
be read as containing two ‘apparently contradictory’97 statements: registration
in a Registry account gives rise simultaneously to a rebuttable presumption
as to title and an irrebuttable one. The extent to which ‘sufficient evidence’
may remain challengeable has been a matter of some debate in both English
and Scots law.98 If inconsistency is to be avoided, ‘sufficient evidence’ here
must mean ‘sufficient to raise a prima facie case’ rather than ‘conclusive’ or
‘irrebuttable’.
On balance, it seems likely that this phrasing is intended to indicate an evi-
dential presumption as to ownership rather than a clear conferral of title upon
registration.99 That impression is affirmed by non-English versions of the Reg-
istry Regulation; for example, the French language text refers to the Registry as
providing ‘une preuve suffisante a` premie`re vue’ – literally ‘a proof sufficient at
first sight’ or ‘prima facie sufficient proof’. This alternative formulation clarifies
that the sufficiency is also prima facie, and therefore potentially challengeable.
Greenhouse Gas Market 2012 42 at https://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/GHG_Report/
2012ghgreport_final.pdf. For detailed discussion of the application of conflict of law rules in
Germany, see Appel and Burghardt, n 63 above.
93 See Annex 1 to the Registry Regulation.
94 Low and Lin, n 3 above, 393.
95 Preamble to Registry Regulation, Art 8 (OJ L 122/2).
96 Registry Regulation, Art 40(2).
97 Financial Markets Law Committee, n 92 above, 3.
98 See discussion in Bisset v Anderson 1949 JC 106; M.L. Ross and J.P. Chalmers, Walker and
Walker: The Law of Evidence in Scotland (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, 4th ed,
2015) para 19.16.2. R. Glover, Murphy on Evidence (Oxford: OUP, 15th ed, 2017) para 2.3.4
appears to assume that evidence that is sufficient is not necessarily conclusive in the sense of
unchallengeable.
99 Compare, for example, the Land Registration Act 2002, s 58, which provides a much clearer
statement of the positive effect of registration, albeit one which has still given rise to debate:
see S. Watterson and A. Goymour, ‘A Tale of Three Promises: (1) The Title Promise’ in A.
Goymour, S. Watterson and M. Dixon (eds), New Perspectives on Land Registration: Contemporary
Problems and Solutions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) 281.
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There is no inconsistency between this interpretation and the dematerialised
nature of allowances. Similar negative registers exist in respect of other types
of incorporeal thing: for example, in English law, registration of a transfer of
shares in the appropriate register is only prima facie evidence of title.100
Transaction finality and rectification
This reading of the Regulation gives rise to a further complication: if the ev-
idence of the register is challengeable, it is logically possible for entitlements
to exist outside of the Registry record. This may give rise to what the Scot-
tish Law Commission describes as ‘bijuralism’, ie a disjuncture between rights
recorded on the register and the position according to the underlying rules of
property law, which implicitly determine whether the register can be consid-
ered accurate.101 In theory, it is open to national principles of property law to
determine that an entry in the Union Registry requires correction. However,
there is no provision in the Registry Regulation that would give effect to any
such off-register rights by means of an opportunity to rectify the register.
Article 70 of the Regulation provides for the unwinding of certain types
of transaction initiated in error, but transfer of allowances between account
holders is not one of the transactions mentioned. Subject to this article, and the
completion of certain automated verification processes conducted pursuant to
Article 103 of the Regulation, ‘a transaction shall become final and irrevocable
upon its finalisation pursuant to Article 104.’102 Unless, therefore, rights arise
in national law to compel a new transaction that could then be registered in the
Union Registry,103 transfers of allowances vitiated by fraud or technical error
cannot be unwound. In practice, the inevitable conclusion is that registration
as holder of an allowance in the Union Registry has a strong protective effect.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how a negative system of registration that does
not allow for correction of register error differs in practice from a system in
which registration operates to confer title. Comparisons can be drawn with the
CREST register for uncertificated securities, in which registration gives rise to
a strong presumption of authenticity.104
This approach is justified in the Registry Regulation by reference to the need
to reduce the disruption to Registry systems and emissions trading markets that
rectification might cause.105 A connection is also drawn between substitutability
of allowances (fungibility) and transaction finality.106 However, the cutting off
100 In respect of certificated and uncertificated shares see Companies Act 2006, ss 127, 768 and
Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/3755) reg 24(1) respectively. For discussion,
see Bridge et al (eds), n 55 above, paras 32-094–32-111.
101 Scottish Law Commission, n 88 above, para 1.11.
102 Registry Regulation, Art 40(3).
103 These provisions are stated to be without prejudice to such rights: Registry Regulation, Art
40(3).
104 See Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/3755) reg 35; Bridge et al, n 55 above,
para 30-149.
105 Preamble to Registry Regulation, Art 8 (OJ L 122/2).
106 ibid, Art 8(8) (OJ L 122/2).
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of prior claims comes at a cost in terms of integrity and responsibility, both of
which are intimately connected to transaction history. It is argued below that
this approach has implications for both transactional and environmental justice.
A claim for rectification based on, for example, fraud or theft has moral and
political, as well as legal, significance.107 The abstract entitlements recorded in
the Registry are, in Derrida’s metaphor, spectres, idealised forms.108 Claims
outside this system are reduced to shadows, but cannot be erased entirely;
ultimately, they may demand some form of redress.
Fungibility and the availability of specific recovery
In line with the emphasis on transaction finality, the Registry Regulation
further limits the scope of national remedies that might lead to the unwinding
of a registered transaction. Article 40(1) states that ‘[a]n allowance or Kyoto unit
shall be a fungible, dematerialised instrument that is tradable on the market.’
This is asserted to imply that ‘any recovery or restitution obligations that may
arise under national law in respect of an allowance or Kyoto unit shall only apply
to the allowance or Kyoto unit in kind.’109 The position of the Regulation
is thus that claims in the case of, for example, theft or insolvency, should not
attach to any specific allowance.110 This is despite each allowance having a
unique identifying number.111
What is meant by fungibility in this context? One classic commercial law
text describes fungibility of intangible property as involving consideration
both of ‘whether [a collection of intangibles is] legally divisible into objects
of separate ownership’ and of whether these objects are, nevertheless, capable
of mutual substitution.112 Separability would appear to require the presence of
some means of identification,113 but substitutability depends on the attitudes of
market participants.114 This will be informed by the legal and social context.
For example, even where shares are individually numbered, this difference is
not material to the share’s legal function.115 The Registry Regulation has the
clear policy that all allowances should be treated as interchangeable by market
participants. One allowance can, by means of its serial number, be distinguished
107 On the rich philosophical heritage of fraud in Scots law, see D. Reid, Fraud in Scots Law (PhD
thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012) esp ch 3; in the context of colonialism and the racism
inherent in erasure of pre-existing claims to land, see S. Keenan, ‘Smoke, Curtains and Mirrors:
The Production of Race Through Time and Title Registration’ (2017) 28 Law and Critique 87.
108 J. Derrida, Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International
(1993, Abingdon: Routledge, Eng tr, 1994).
109 Registry Regulation, Art 40(3).
110 ibid.
111 ibid, Art 41(3).
112 R. Goode and E. McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (London: Lexis Nexis, 5th ed, 2016)
para 2.90.
113 A basic requirement for the existence of a proprietary claim: see for example R. Goode, ‘Are
Intangible Assets Fungible?’ [2003] LMCLQ 379, 382.
114 A point made by many: see for example Gorzelak, n 30 above, 380; Goode, ibid, 383.
115 Assuming shares are of the same issue/class. This point is made by, for example, Gorzelak, ibid,
380; Goode and McKendrick, n 112 above, para 2.90.
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from another but the terms of Article 40(1) make plain that this is not intended
to compromise their functional equivalence.
How does substitutability relate to the stance that proprietary claims in re-
spect of specific allowances should not be permitted? The existence of any
necessary connection between the unwinding of transactions and fungibility is
disputed;116 there are many other factors that might influence the availability of
specific recovery within a legal system. Moreover, a claim for specific recovery
may have advantages compared to other, non-proprietary, claims that apply
regardless of whether the property is fungible or not. However, from the per-
spective of the Registry Regulation, a claim for specific recovery is inevitably
historically based. It threatens to reintroduce the very questions and distinc-
tions between allowances that the provisions regarding transaction finality have
sought to exclude. Further, the availability of specific recovery is of greatest
importance where objects are not functionally interchangeable. The logic of
emissions trading is such that equivalent allowances should always, in theory,
be sufficient to satisfy a claim.
The Regulation is clear as to the doctrinal status of allowances. However,
the extent to which legal fungibility can insulate allowances from political and
moral conflict is less certain. It is argued below that, as the political processes
surrounding the creation of individual allowances are not fungible, the origins
and trajectories of particular allowances will remain relevant.
Protection of acquirers in good faith
As an individual allowance is transferred between market participants, it begins
to accumulate a legal and material history. Such history has the potential to give
rise to differentiation between validly acquired allowances and those obtained
following a defective transfer. Alongside the prohibition of specific recovery,
the Registry Regulation renders this distinction irrelevant, providing that ‘a
purchaser and holder of an allowance or Kyoto unit acting in good faith shall
acquire title to an allowance or Kyoto unit free of any defects in the title of the
transferor’.117 Interpretation of the term ‘good faith’ is left to national law.118
Given the ability of EUAs to pass quickly between legal systems, it
remains to be seen whether the existence of this provision will lead to the
development of a harmonised interpretation of the Registry Regulation or
a shared conceptual framework regarding terms such as ‘good faith’.119 The
construction of a ‘European’ property law continues to be controversial;
there is a tendency to see shared property principles as a greater threat to
sovereignty and internal doctrinal consistency than contractual rules.120 In
116 See for example Financial Markets Law Committee, n 92 above; Low and Lin, n 3 above, 403.
117 Registry Regulation, Art 40(4).
118 No definition is provided in the Registry Regulation. See also information on the Commission
website at https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry_en#tab-0-2.
119 On the interaction between national legal systems and EU law here, see Godt, n 63 above,
32-35.
120 For exploration of this tendency, see D. Caruso, ‘Private Law and Public Stakes in European
Integration: The Case of Property’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 751.
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practice, consistent interpretation of good faith is of less importance than the
divergence in approaches to the legal nature of allowances.
The facts in Armstrong provide a good example of the type of scenario
affected by the Regulation. Armstrong, the operator of a linoleum factory
based in Germany, held a number of EUAs in an account with what was, at that
point, the national registry for the purpose of complying with its obligations
under the EU ETS. Following a ‘phishing’ scam, hackers gained access to
Armstrong’s account and were able to fraudulently transfer Armstrong’s credits
to the account of an English trader, Winnington. Winnington quickly sold on
the EUAs to a third party, who was not involved in the litigation.
Under the rule now enacted, were Winnington to be able to establish that
it had bought the allowances in good faith, Armstrong would be deprived of
title at the point when they were registered in Winnington’s name. This would
be due not to any guarantee of title that might be provided by the Union
Registry, but rather to the fact that registration completed Winnington’s (good
faith) purchase. In Armstrong itself, if and when Armstrong had lost legal title
to the allowances was open to debate. Stephen Morris QC had to resort to
a potentially confusing notion of ‘de facto legal title’ based on ‘ministerial
control’ to explain how the fraudsters had interfered with Armstrong’s rights
to the EUAs.121 The new rules operate to make this situation clearer: Arm-
strong would unambiguously have been deprived of its rights over the EUAs
in question.
It is not the moral qualities associated with ‘good faith’ that justify protecting
acquirers over persons with competing claims here.122 As with the exclusion
of specific recovery, conferral of title functions as a means of maintaining ho-
mogeneity and encouraging market participation, via the generation of trust
and confidence among market actors.123 The logic of facilitation of trade is
seen to favour dynamic security (protection of acquirers) over static security
(protection of existing owners).124 Good faith provisos may be more usefully
understood as filters for inappropriate claims, rather than stand-alone justifi-
cations. Indeed, they are liable to themselves introduce a certain amount of
instability and uncertainty.
The guarantee of good title is a further means by which the notional fungibil-
ity of allowances is maintained. When historical defects in title are eliminated,
the levels of risk associated with each allowance are equalised. As to whether
this is necessary, Worthington has suggested that features that cannot be dis-
covered at the time of the transfer are not relevant to whether the goods are
121 See further Armstrong n 46 above at [276] and, for discussion, Low and Lin, n 3 above, 391. See
also Sheehan, n 46 above, 426-427.
122 For further discussion of the justificatory role of good faith, see B. Holligan, Protection of Ownership
and Transfer of Moveables by a Non-Owner in Scots Law (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015)
part 6(D)(2). In Armstrong, initial arguments regarding the culpability of Armstrong employees
whose passwords had been compromised by ‘phishing’ attacks were dropped during litigation:
see Armstrong ibid at [25].
123 For example, when discussing the currency of money, Fox refers to the need to eliminate
‘information uncertainty’ regarding the possibility of defects in the transferor’s title, see Fox, n
73 above, para 2.07.
124 See for example Low and Lin, n 3 above, 384-385. For discussion and further references, see
Holligan, n 122 above, part 5C(2).
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fungible or not.125 She gives the example of sterile grains of wheat or shares
with defects in title, which nevertheless remain fungible.126 While this analysis
is logically persuasive, the material operation of markets is liable to belie such
formal equality. The unreliability of particular sources, whether of grain or
allowances, may be suspected in advance and could therefore ‘taint’ particular
units. A guarantee of valid title removes the need for such distinctions. A use-
ful analogy is the existence of similar rules in respect of coins and banknotes,
which Fox characterises as supporting the economic function of currency by
preventing discounting.127 The ‘anonymity’ of money as medium facilitates
impersonal transaction between parties who do not know one another.128
RESTORING PROPRIETY
The illusion of fungibility
The cumulative effect of the provisions described above is to maintain the
consistency of emissions allowances as both units of account and stores of
value. However, such consistency comes at a cost. A growing critical literature
has argued that the complex blend of public and private interests affected by the
EU ETS cannot be captured adequately by an abstract carbon ‘currency’.129
There may be various biological and political reasons why one unit of CO2e
should not be treated as equivalent to another.130 This is a critique that strikes
at the very premise of emissions trading, but, from a doctrinal perspective, it
illuminates the contradictions between specificity and abstraction that transfer
rules must manage. If we take what Godt refers to as the ‘publicness of property’
seriously, our choices as to which non-equivalences matter must be subjected
to scrutiny.131
This section develops this argument to claim that, even within an EU ETS
based on fungibility of allowances, property rules cannot be reduced to a matter
of commodity creation. As Alexander puts it, property is about propriety as well
as commodity.132 Propriety here relates to property’s function as ‘the material
foundation for creating andmaintaining the proper social order, the private basis
for the public good.’133 This characterisation applies to the property structures
that regulate our use of corporeal things, but manifestly also to the function of
emissions trading schemes in coordinating emissions reduction activity.
125 S. Worthington, ‘Sorting out ownership interests in a bulk: gifts, sales and trusts’ (1999) Journal
of Business Law 1, 5.
126 ibid, 6.
127 See Fox, n 73 above, paras 2.24-2.55.
128 See ibid, para 2.18.
129 See for example G. Bryant, Carbon Markets in a Climate-Changing Capitalism (Cambridge: CUP,
2019); Salzman and Ruhl, n 76 above; Descheneau, n 76 above; Knox-Hayes, n 81 above, 121.
130 Salzman and Ruhl distinguish non-fungibilities of space, time and type, see ibid, 626-630.
131 C. Godt, ‘Regulatory Property Rights: New Insights from Private Property Theory for the
Takings Doctrine’ (2017) 6 European Property Law Journal 158, 161.
132 G. Alexander, Commodity and Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought
1776-1970 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
133 ibid, 1.
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Without claiming that there is any fixed or limited set of values underpin-
ning emissions trading schemes,134 the remainder of the article argues that the
public and political functions of property suggest that a different approach to
transfer of allowances is needed. In particular, this section identifies historically-
conditioned ideas of integrity and responsibility as important foundations for
both transactional and environmental justice.
History and origins
The commodity-based property rules in the Registry Regulation attempt to
erase historical distinctions between allowances, but this is likely to displace,
rather than resolve, legal and political conflict. To return to the metaphor
of the spectre, the past may continue to intrude if not confronted. Many
property systems are deeply historical: establishing title depends, at least to some
extent, on enquiry into the material and legal past of the thing concerned. At
one extreme, Pottage describes transfer of land prior to land registration as
embedded in ‘networks of organic or practical memory’.135 Within the EU
ETS, transaction history has a public as well as private significance: it is a
fundamental private law principle that a valid transfer requires a valid origin
(nemo dat quod non habet),136 but all transactions are embedded within a broader
justificatory story that has political and ecological dimensions.
The dispute over the cancellation of improperly allocated allowances in
ArcelorMittal137 illustrates that this public story includes the creation and initial
allocation of allowances, as well as their transfer within the market. It is for
this reason that, despite their functional equivalence, allowances require the
stable identity provided by their unique serial number. To the extent that past
transactions justify current holdings, they are intimately linked to questions of
integrity and responsibility, discussed further below; the design of the EU ETS
makes it impossible to separate the results of market trading from the ability to
meet environmental liabilities by surrendering allowances.
The real-life, local and specific operation of the market challenges the ideal
of homogeneity of allowances within both the public and the private realm.
As Descheneau explains, the commodity status of carbon has never fully sta-
bilised.138 The political process of cap-setting and initial allocation of allowances
has proven far from anodyne;139 Bailey andMaresh refer to the ‘territorial logic’
134 Manea, n 3 above, argues that regimes must account for a range of competing values and purposes.
For an argument that emissions trading reflects a social obligation norm, see B. France-Hudson,
‘Surprisingly Social: Private Property and Environmental Management’ (2017) 29 Journal of
Environmental Law 101.
135 A. Pottage, ‘The Measure of Land’ (1994) 57 MLR 361, 361.
136 No one can give what he or she does not have.
137 n 70 above.
138 n 76 above, 606.
139 On the contests over regulatory power in this area, see S. Bogojevic, Emissions Trading Schemes:
Markets, States and Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) ch 5.
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that reimposes itself on the supposedly neutral market domain.140 As with cur-
rency, there is an important link to sovereignty: in the end it is this political
foundation that maintains a currency’s value.141 Even new forms of currency not
based on state authority require to tell a convincing political origin story.142 The
decision by the European Commission to prevent the surrender of allowances
issued by the United Kingdom after its exit from the EU, requiring the country
code of UK-issued allowances to be made visible, demonstrates that, regardless
of legal fungibility, the political origin of each allowance remains latent and
cannot be erased entirely.143 The politics of allocation are also relevant when
linking emissions trading schemes.144 Attention to allocation history is essential
here to avoid windfalls and to ensure harmonisation of responsibilities across
linked schemes.
An invisible, but important, distinction is that between EU allowances cre-
ated in accordance with the EU cap on emissions and those produced by the
exchange of international credits generated from offset activities. While identi-
cal in Registry accounts,145 the location and cause of greenhouse gas emissions
continues to be significant. Even those who support the construction of carbon
as abstract currency recognise that, like coins of different currencies, units of
CO2e from different schemes are often not exactly equivalent.146 The limits
to abstraction and fungibility are evident in the restrictions imposed by the
Commission within the EU ETS upon the use of offset credits derived from
industrial gas reduction projects, which turned out to be incentivising the pro-
duction of other harmful gases.147 It has also been necessary to ensure that
international credits surrendered in the EU ETS are not ‘recycled’ and used
again in compliance with international emissions accounting obligations.148
Again, reckoning with political and ecological origins is critical in securing
environmental integrity; the success of the EU ETS will ultimately be judged
on its material effects, which thus far have been underwhelming.149 A close
140 I. Bailey and S. Maresh, ‘Scales and networks of neoliberal climate governance: the regulatory
and territorial logics of European Union emissions trading’ (2009) 34 Transactions of the Institute
of British Geographers 445.
141 Again, the role of the state here is controversial: see sources at n 76 above.
142 On bitcoin, see K.F.K. Low and E. Teo, ‘Legal Risks of Owning Cryptocurrencies’ in D.L.K
Chuen and R. Deng (eds), Handbook of Blockchain, Digital Finance, and Inclusion, Volume 1
(London: Elsevier, 2017) 225, 234.
143 See sources at n 4 above. These provisions will only apply where allowances issued by the UK
are not surrendered before exit.
144 See F.G. Tiche, S.E. Weishaar and O. Couwenberg, ‘Carbon Leakage, Free Allocation and
Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2014) 2 Carbon and Climate Law Review 97.
145 H. Lovell and D. Liverman, ‘Understanding Carbon Offset Technologies’ (2010) 15New Political
Economy 253, 260, note that this disassociation is deliberate in the compliance market.
146 See for example Button, n 76 above, 585.
147 Commission Regulation (EU) No 550/2011 on determining, pursuant to Directive
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, certain restrictions applicable
to the use of international credits from projects involving industrial gases OJ L 149/1. See fur-
ther D. Mackenzie, ‘Making things the same: Gases, emission rights and the politics of carbon
markets’ (2008) 34 Accounting, Organizations and Society 440, 444-447; G. Bryant, ‘The Politics
of Carbon Market Design: Rethinking the Technopolitics and Post-politics of Climate Change’
(2016) 48 Antipode 877, 881-884.
148 See references at nn 40-42 above.
149 See references at n 38 above.
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link has been identified between initial allocation of allowances and abatement
decisions.150 Without historically-based responsibility, incentives to invest in
long-term technological improvements are likely to be diluted.151
Inextricable from this material history is the legal history of market trans-
fers of allowances. Individual allowances may have been transferred from the
legitimate holder’s account in circumstances where consent was absent or vi-
tiated. The provisions of the Registry Regulation respond to the previously
mentioned series of ‘phishing’ attacks and electronic thefts from national reg-
istries in 2010 and early 2011, in which millions of allowances were stolen.152
This caused access to national registries to be suspended in January 2011.153
It has been reported that some national authorities began to publish blacklists
of the serial numbers of stolen allowances, and that certain traders began to
request guarantees of original acquisition from government auction.154 Nield
and Pereira note that the BlueNext exchange even opened a ‘safe trading zone’
that allowed purchasers to choose only those allowances with a verified trading
history.155 InHolcim,156 a cement producer unsuccessfully sought damages from
the European Commission on account of its failure to disclose the location of
stolen allowances.
Registry policy here is caught between the moves in environmental
governance towards transparency and availability of information and the
drive in commodity markets to compress information in order to facilitate
transfer.157 The provisions discussed earlier privilege anonymous and friction-
less trade. They were accompanied by restrictions on the disclosure of the
serial numbers of allowances, presumably to discourage any investigation of
past transactions.158 This is a position that has been justifiably criticised by
environmental NGOs, on the grounds that it makes scrutiny of trading activity
more difficult.159 However, although the history of an individual allowance is
150 T. Laing et al, ‘The effects and side-effects of the EU emissions trading scheme’ (2014) 5WIREs
Climate Change 509, 511.
151 R. Baldwin, M. Cave, and M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice
(Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2011) 206.
152 European Commission, MEMO/11/34, 21.1.2011 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-11-34_en.htm and Oliver Sartor (Caisse des De´poˆts Climat Research), Climate Brief
No 4 February 2011: Closing the door to fraud in the EU ETS.
153 European Commission, Press Release 19.01.2011 Announcement of transitional measure: EU ETS
registry system at https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011011901_en.
154 Appel and Burghardt, n 63 above, 229 fn 6; J. Chaffin, ‘Carbon Trading: Into Thin Air’ Financial
Times 14 February 2011.
155 n 10 above, 206.
156 n 60 above.
157 For an example of this conflict, see C-524/09 Ville de Lyon EU:C:2010:822. For analysis of
attempts to build transparency into environmental markets, see R.L. Glicksman and T. Kaime,
‘A Comparative Analysis of Accountability Mechanisms for Ecosystem Services Markets in the
United States and the European Union’ (2013) 2 Transnational Environmental Law 259, 273-276.
158 See Registry Regulation, Art 110(1); Zaman, n 92 above, 43-44; and European Com-
mission, MEMO/11/495 8.7.2011 at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
en/MEMO_11_495.
159 See Sandbag, Briefing: Fresh concerns over the transparency of the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS)
(2011) at https://sandbag.org.uk/project/fresh-concerns-over-the-transparency-of-the-eu-emi
ssions-trading-scheme-ets/.
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now more difficult, albeit not impossible,160 to trace, integrity still rests on the
ability to link current to past transactions.
Transactional and environmental integrity
Integrity here has similarly both public and private dimensions. Participation
in the market is often involuntary and the meeting of public policy objectives
delegated to market systems;161 the corollary of this is that market transactions
have wider implications for environmental policy.162 The reliability of the
registry is directly linked to environmental integrity: as the CJEU has noted,
‘accurate accounting is inherent in the very purpose of the directive’.163 The
approach taken to transactional integrity by the Registry Regulation is not
convincing; it may have averted short-term crisis but, it is argued below, will
not generate long-term stability. In order to fulfil the aims of the EU ETS,
a better balance is required between liquidity and integrity. Property norms
should support the just allocation of responsibility rather than simply suppress
dispute.
In theory, transfer rules may impact the environmental integrity of the EU
ETS in a number of ways. Unjust allocations may have direct environmental
impacts, for example a factory owner such as Armstrong who has his or her
allowances stolen may be forced to acquire new allowances on the market,
diverting resources away from environmental improvements. There may also
be indirect impacts if transactional problems disturb market function: some
participants may be reluctant to engage in trading, and market distortion may
prevent the most efficient environmental outcomes being reached. This is less
an empirical claim than a logical implication from the premise that market
exchange will move emissions-reduction activity to the most cost-effective
locations. Such activity depends, in many ways, on property, in the sense of
a mechanism that links resources to particular persons. If this relation mal-
functions, the market will no longer provide the correct incentives to reduce
emissions.
This is not to suggest that property rules alone can produce integrity. How-
ever, even more than in the case of, for example, crypto-currencies, the status
of allowances as objects of property, with a stable identity, is important to their
function.164 Given the connection between individual, numbered allowances
and actual emissions, market activity provides a connection, however distant
160 In Holcim, the CJEU emphasised that confidential information regarding market transactions
could be obtained and shared by national authorities, allowing victims of theft to pursue relevant
legal claims.
161 Bogojevic, n 139 above, 176 refers to the ‘co-production’ of market and environmental
objectives.
162 For example, there is a need to ensure transparency and accountability: see Glicksman and
Kaime, n 157 above.
163 ArcelorMittal n 71 above at [24]. This point is emphasised by F. Dinguirard et al, Emissions Trading
Registries: Guidance on Regulation, Development and Administration (World Bank Group, 2016) x.
164 Affording proprietary status to electronic tokens may carry some risks for users. See Low and
Teo, n 142 above.
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and tenuous, to responsibility for action. Despite the risks generated by his-
torical defects, the correlation of past and future entitlements is of both public
and private significance.
The Commission’s decision in 2011 to prevent the following or recovery of
specific allowances raises suspicion that property rules are being used here to
mask deficiencies in market regulation. High-profile thefts had been followed
by a 75 per cent fall in spot trading volumes and a fall in carbon prices.165
The desire to avoid further market disruption is reflected in the exclusion of
historically-based property claims in the Registry Regulation. It is questionable
to what extent this, in effect, deregulation, is the best way to address such
difficulties. To some extent, it is illustrative of a broader tendency towards crisis
within financial systems.166 There is a contradiction in the commercial need
for stability and predictability, which favours not only abstraction, but also the
creation of uniform behavioural standards, and the fact that any regulatory
process of standardisation and bureaucratisation will in itself operate to impede
market liquidity.167 This is particularly acute in the emissions trading market,
which is indisputably constituted by state regulation.168
It remains the case that rules of national law may operate to redress the
imbalance outlined here, but, in the context of an EU-wide market, a unitary
approach has obvious benefits. The analogy drawn, but not pursued, in Holcim
between money laundering and emissions trading fraud is worth considering
further: it is difficult to tackle EU-wide financial flows at a purely national level
and it is widely accepted that banks, as channels through which funds move,
have some responsibilities to detect and prevent suspect transactions. The same
applies to emissions trading registries. Indeed, it seems likely that there is a
close connection between the type of fraudulent activities outlined earlier and
money laundering.169 Proprietary remedies are merely one response to fraud
and theft; it is suggested below, however, that they fulfil a unique function.
Responsibility and transfer rules
As property rules, on this analysis, secure the distribution of responsibilities
within the market scheme, the conflict between integrity and liquidity appears
particularly intractable. Both are vital to market operation. The remainder of
the article argues that, given the fusion of public and private interests outlined
above, the EU ETS is distinct from other types of commodity market; a more
cautious approach to unauthorised transfer is needed. This follows both from
the aims of the EU ETS and the nature of trading activity, in which both volun-
tary and involuntary participants are implicated. To encourage careful trading
165 Nield and Pereira, n 10 above, 206-207.
166 On the contradictions within finance capitalism, see D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital (London:
Verso, 2006) ch 9.
167 A point expressed in slightly different terms by Button, n 76 above, 587.
168 Bogojevic, n 139 above.
169 See Frunza, n 39 above, ch 6.
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behaviour, while maintaining confidence, only those who acquire allowances
via a valid transfer from the registered owner should receive a guaranteed title.
This position is founded on the view expressed earlier that the nature of
an EUA, and its connection to the material world, means that proprietary
logic is necessary to secure environmental, as well as transactional, justice.
Compare, for example, the balance of liabilities in electronic banking systems,
which is generally settled by public regulation.170 As Fox explains, the most
important practical issue is the just and efficient allocation of loss between
holder and bank, rather than the possibility of a proprietary claim.171 However,
the identity of an individual EUA is distinct in a way that the identity of
a notional unit of money in an electronic bank account ledger is not (but
a unit of algorithm-based currency such as bitcoin may be).172 As outlined
earlier, origins and history have a specific significance within the EU ETS.
Legal fungibility notwithstanding, the ability to identify and follow particular
allowances supports transparency and ensures that circulation does not operate
to obscure fraud. The more abstract the commodity created, the longer and
more complicated are the chains of responsibility involved and themore difficult
the assessment of risk. An extreme example is the rise of collateralised debt
obligations in the United States prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis.173
The fungibility of allowances should operate, in theory, to depoliticise and
deterritorialise the process of emissions reduction, as the possibility of trade-
offs means that there is no longer a need to obtain political consensus around
specific actions by specific persons. Questions of distribution of liability can
only be deferred, however, not avoided entirely.174 In reality, the apparent
equivalence between emissions allowances serves only to obscure the fact that
fault is by no means equally shared. A small number of actors are responsible
for a disproportionate fraction of the emissions covered by the EU ETS.175
This pre-existing inequality is compounded by the uneven development of the
EU ETS market: allocation decisions have resulted in large windfalls and have
fundamentally reinforced existing lines of power and responsibility.176 Examples
170 For the English position, see I.H-Y. Chiu and J. Wilson, Banking Law and Regulation (Oxford:
OUP, 2019) ch 3.
171 Fox, n 73 above, para 5.126.
172 As Green argues, the cryptographic data string that constitutes a bitcoin can be understood
as a thing in its own right: see S. Green, ‘It’s Virtually Money’ in D. Fox and S. Green (eds),
Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law (Oxford: OUP, 2019) para 2.04. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that a bitcoin is transferred from one party to another: D. Fox, ‘A Crypto-Coin
as an Object of Property’ in Fox and Green, ibid para 6.18. For a slightly different analysis,
see K.F.K. Low and E. Teo, ‘Bitcoins and Other Cryptocurrencies As Property?’ (2017) 9 Law,
Innovation & Technology 235, 253.
173 On this, see T. Juutilainen, ‘Law-Based Commodification of Private Debt’ (2016) 22 European
Law Journal 743, 753.
174 Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, n 151 above, 200.
175 G. Bryant, ‘Creating a level playing field? The concentration and centralisation of emissions in
the European Union Emissions Trading System’ (2016) 99 Energy Policy 308, 310 finds that two
per cent of ultimate owners were responsible for over 75 per cent of verified emissions during
the period 2005-2012.
176 On the difficulty in ensuring distributional fairness, see Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, n 151 above,
213-214. R Martin, M. Muˆuls and U.J. Wagner, ‘Trading Behavior in the EU ETS’ in M.
Gronwald and B. Hintermann, Emissions Trading as a Policy Instrument: Evaluation and Prospects
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range from the disproportionate use of linking credits by a small number of large
emitters,177 to the fact that such actors, particularly state-owned enterprises,
are more likely to be engaged in trading.178
What relevance does this have to the proprietary status of allowances? The
abstraction afforded to currency is valuable precisely because it limits the trans-
mission of liability and accountability in commercial contexts. As a basis for
environmental policy, this is less attractive. There is a public interest in ensuring
that transactions distributing important responsibilities are amenable to scrutiny.
Despite the ostensible neutrality of property rules, the inequalities maintained
by the EU ETS market are reflected in the small number of participants from
whom large numbers of allowances were stolen.179 In Holcim, for example, the
large cement producer that lost one million allowances had already benefited
from over-allocation of allowances. The ability to track the historical trajec-
tory of individual allowances as they circulate helps to make these connections
visible.
DESIGNING ACCOUNTABLE SYSTEMS
Information, good faith and obligation
Within the law of personal property, evidential difficulties in relation to tangible
property have furthered the adoption of ahistorical rules protecting good faith
purchasers.180 In the case of intangibles such as EUAs, the major problem is
not that evidence (in the form of transaction records) is lacking altogether, but
determination of how such information is distributed and made use of. In light
of the connections drawn earlier between environmental and transactional
integrity, this section argues that those misled by inaccurate registry records
should be protected, but not those who purchase from a thief or fraudster
posing as the registered holder of allowances.
This approach is based on a distinction between transactional error, in which
the Registry record is correct prior to the transfer, and registry error, in which
the information in the Registry pre-transfer is incorrect.181 Registry error is
outwith the control of market participants, but transactional error can (to some
extent) be prevented if parties act with a reasonable level of care during the
transaction. In Armstrong, the ability of the hackers to transfer Armstrong’s al-
lowances into Winnington’s account was important in misleading Winnington.
However, the judgment implies that, if Winnington had taken more care in
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015) 213, 225 note a ‘status quo bias’, whereby the outcome of
trading often mirrors initial allocation.
177 Bryant, n 130 above, 316-317.
178 C. Kettner, ‘Analyses of allowance transactions – firm behaviour in the first trading phase and
learnings from the data’ in Weishaar and Woerdman, n 10 above, 69.
179 See Nield and Pereira, n 11 above, 202-203.
180 See for example Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 24 and 25 and, for analysis of the importance of
epistemological considerations, Holligan, n 122 above, part 5B(1).
181 On the difference between transactional and registry error, see Scottish Law Commission, n 88
above, paras 3.15-3.18.
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ascertaining the identity of the persons with whom they were transacting, the
fraud may have been uncovered at an earlier stage.182
A better balance could be struck here between integrity and liquidity. Mod-
ern cryptographic techniques make it possible to build information systems
that can distinguish the objects of invalid transfers from those that have been
validly transferred.183 However, this does not mean that key market actors,
such as exchanges, want this information; in some ways, it seems that a certain
knowledge deficit is necessary for markets to function. Anderson, Shumailov
and Ahmed refer to ‘information avoidance’;184 in the emissions trading con-
text, neither buyers, sellers nor regulators have any incentive to examine the
commodity traded, or its history, too closely.185 This conflict between abstrac-
tion and transparency has been explored above with reference to the CJEU’s
approach in Holcim.
A cynical view of the recent reforms is that they were intended primarily
to protect the Commission, as operator of the Union Registry,186 from liti-
gation.187 This objective is not entirely without merit. In relation to money,
Fox points out that one of the principal modern functions of property rules
protecting bona fide purchasers is to protect banks as ‘channelling points’ that
enable the circulation of funds.188 It is reasonable to compare here the function
of banks to that of the Union Registry.189 A similar justification could be made
for protecting the ability of the Registry to operate with minimal exposure
to litigation. However, this does not necessarily mean that traders should be
protected from the consequences of transactional irregularities that they had
the ability to guard against.
In contrast to the position taken by the German legislator, which has chosen
to protect even bad faith acquirers of EUAs from challenge,190 it is submitted
that the emissions market does not require total abstraction to function. Pro-
motion of certainty191 and market confidence does not justify protection of all
acquirers, but rather protection from histories that go beyond those disclosed
by the Registry. An entirely untraceable currency might well attract increased
market activity but would present unacceptable risks in terms of integrity. The
182 See Armstrong n 46 above at [238].
183 R. Anderson, I. Shumailov and M. Ahmed, Making Bitcoin Legal (Cambridge University Com-
puter Laboratory, 2018) describe the development of a ‘taintchain’ that can accurately identify
bitcoins tainted by theft.
184 R. Anderson, I. Shumailov and M. Ahmed, Bitcoin Redux (Cambridge University Computer
Laboratory, 2018) 10.
185 A point noted by L. Lohmann, ‘Financialization, Commodification and Carbon: The Contra-
dictions of Neoliberal Climate Policy’ (2012) 48 Socialist Register 85, 87.
186 To the extent that the Commission appoints the ‘central administrator’ responsible for maintain-
ing the independent transaction log recording the issue, transfer and cancellation of allowances:
see Emissions Trading Directive, Art 20.
187 See for example Low and Lin, n 3 above, 28.
188 Fox, n 73 above, paras 2.54-2.55.
189 See for example C.P. Carlarne, Climate Change Law and Policy: EU and US Approaches (Oxford:
OUP, 2010) 172.
190 § 7(4) Treibhausgas-Emissionshandelsgesetz.
191 Cited by the German legislator in the relevant legislative comment: Bundestags-Drucksache.
15/2328, 15.
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fact that EUAs embody exchange value192 does not mean that their legal and
material histories should be entirely disregarded or hidden.
Further, the extent to which protection of purchasers will actually serve to
encourage market liquidity is more controversial than the orthodox account
suggests.193 Empirical analysis of the effect of transfer rules on trade is beyond
the scope of this article, but, at best, the good faith protection rules are only one
factor among many others that may influence market liquidity and volatility.194
As several commentators note, the availability of remedies other than specific
recovery of the EUAs concerned, such as the personal liability in equity based
upon knowing receipt that was recognised in Armstrong,195 may be equally
disconcerting to market participants.196 If the overall aim is to influence risk
perception among traders, reform of property rules appears a somewhat limited
and ineffective way of achieving this objective. At least part of the 2010–
2011 crisis in the EU ETS can be attributed to the lack of any regulation
of traders in some jurisdictions;197 the Registry Regulation now provides for
a harmonised approach to registration and identity verification of traders.198
Moreover, it is possible for market participants to use contractual mechanisms
such as warranties to achieve an acceptable balance of risk between buyer and
seller.199
Accuracy and the register
The logical conclusion of the arguments above is that no provision protecting
good (or bad) faith purchasers is necessary. Rather, it is the reliability of the
register that requires legal attention. As Low and Lin point out, when it comes
to intangible property, an actionable interference will only take place where
the law recognises some effect on the rights of the claimant.200 It is therefore
crucial to clarify what effect a registration that takes place as a result of fraud
or error will have on the rights of persons concerned. As discussed earlier, it
appears that registration is only prima facie evidence of entitlement. However,
the Registry Regulation operates to exclude rectification of the register in most
circumstances. In practice, registration has something equivalent to a positive
effect. Indeed, German law, for example, states this expressly.201 Unless national
law provides for the execution of a new Registry transaction, registered titles
192 This is also cited by the German legislator, ibid.
193 See for example J.S. Rogers, ‘Negotiability, Property, and Identity’ (1990) 12 Cardozo Law
Review 471, 479-484. For fuller analysis of the law and economics research on this point, see
Holligan, n 122 above, part 5C(3).
194 See Fox, n 73 above, paras 2.44-2.55.
195 n 46 above.
196 See for example Zaman, n 92 above, 45; Low and Lin, n 3 above, 403.
197 For example, Frunza refers to the Danish registry, where only an email address was required
to open an emissions trading account, n 39 above, 151 and, on the key role this played in
perpetuating various types of fraud, 151-155.
198 See Registry Regulation, Art 18 and Annex IV.
199 On the role of contractual provision in emissions trading, see Manea, n 3 above, ch 3, esp 73-74.
200 Low and Lin, n 3 above, 390-391.
201 § 7(4) Treibhausgas-Emissionshandelsgesetz.
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will be virtually indefeasible. The consequences for those deprived of rights are
troubling: in order to secure the registration system, off-register entitlements
are destroyed, and questions of redress left to the patchwork of national laws.
An additional dimension here is the speed of electronic transfer. As Stephen
Morris QC in Armstrong comments, ‘trading in EUAs takes place very quickly
and they can be sold several times in a day’.202 The use of technology and fraud-
detecting algorithms to authenticate transactions may accelerate the registry
monitoring and verification process.203 However, no system, electronic or
otherwise, is totally infallible and algorithmic validation cannot guarantee legal
validity.204 Rather than entrust our security to technical code, it is, as has
recently been argued in the context of securities transferred via blockchain,
crucial to assert the primacy of human law through the application of just
property rules.205 There is reason to be cautious about proposals for blockchain-
based decentralised electronic ledgers in emissions trading.206
A system that provided explicitly for deferred indefeasibility would allow
for the recognition and correction of transactional error while maintaining the
ability of traders to rely on the information contained in the Registry. Registra-
tion as holder of an allowance would not provide an immediately valid title, but
rather a title that might become indefeasible on some later event such as a valid
transfer to a third party. The conditions for transactional validity could continue
to be determined at national level and might or might not include good faith
on the part of the acquirer. The reliability of the register would be guaranteed,
while acquirers would gain some incentive to transact responsibly.207 Of course,
rapidity of transfer may erode the temporal and legal gap between immediate
and deferred protection here, but the transaction confirmation delay specified
in Article 39(3) of the Registry Regulation provides some, limited, protection.
There are a number of different ways in which the outcome described here
could be reached, but some amendment to the Registry Regulation would be
required. The current rules are potentially unjust in the balance struck between
the abstraction demanded by market exchange and systemic integrity. In order
to create a frictionless market, competing claims are simply (with the exception
of national law remedies) erased. Conflict cannot, however, be suppressed so
easily; the current rules displace dispute at the expense of transparency and
202 n 46 above at [19].
203 For examples, see Dinguirard et al, n 163 above, para 4.3.2.
204 On the distinction between validation through code and legal validity and the poten-
tial for continuing problems with the security of electronic systems, see K.F.K. Low and
E. Mik, ‘Pause the Blockchain Legal Revolution’ (2020) 69 International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly 135, 140, 177-159; Low and Teo, n 144 above; and M. Funk, ‘The
Hack that Warmed the World’ Foreign Policy 30 January 2015 at http://foreignpolicy.com/
2015/01/30/climate-change-hack-carbon-credit-black-dragon/.
205 Paech, n 5 above. On the dynamic interaction between legal and technical code and the need
for human accountability, see K. Yeung, ‘Regulation by Blockchain: The Emerging Battle for
Supremacy between the Code of Law and Code as Law’ (2019) 82 MLR 207.
206 See for example Climate Ledger Initiative, Navigating Blockchain and Climate Action (2018); A.
Marke (ed), Transforming Climate Finance and Green Investment with Blockchains (London: Academic
Press, 2018).
207 This is the approach advocated, for example, by the Scottish Law Commission in their reform
of Scotland’s land registration system: see Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration
(Scot Law Com No 222, 2010).
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transactional justice. While ArcelorMittal and Holcim imply that the Registry
Regulation is unlikely to be found to breach the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, a more nuanced approach to the effect of
registration would better balance the competing interests concerned.
CONCLUSIONS: PROPERTY, MARKETS AND HISTORY
In one sense, the good faith purchase of emissions allowances is a classic prop-
erty law problem, pertaining principally to the allocation of rights and duties
between private persons. It is evident from the discussion above, however, that
the nature of the entitlements involved and the public interest in the environ-
mental effects of emissions trading adds a further dimension to the choice of
property rules. The abstraction inherent in the construction of emissions trading
markets serves to obscure the spatial and ecological relationships that underlie
a carbon ‘currency’, and the adoption of property rules that erase the history
of emissions allowances is likely further to exacerbate this tendency. Taking the
interpenetration of public and private seriously requires greater attentiveness to
the public dimensions of the property rules regulating transfer of allowances.
The elision of transactional and environmental responsibility within the EU
ETS makes it particularly concerning that the Registry Regulation facilitates
evasion of both.
Although the commodity form, as Marx puts it, ‘bursts through all restric-
tions as to time, place and individuals’,208 it is never fully stabilised. This is
evident in the pressure placed by the historical and material (Brexit, fraud, ETS
linkage) on the legal fungibility of allowances. It is necessary to question the
neutrality of ‘technical’ moves and ‘technopolitics’, whereby inherently messy
and political questions are regulated by means of opaque and unaccountable
bureaucratic processes.209 The Commission response to problems of fraud and
uncertainty has been to reduce the transparency and traceability of individual
allowances, in the hope that obscuring transaction history from the public and
from potential purchasers will protect the stability and certainty of the mar-
ket. A preferable response would be to distinguish between transactional and
register error, protecting against mistakes on the register, but not defects in
a transfer from the registered holder. This would operate to, in a small way,
‘resynchronise’210 the emissions trading market with its juridical, political and
ecological foundations.
208 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol 1 (1867, Moscow: Progress Publishers, Eng
tr, 2015) 77.
209 See Bryant, n 147 above.
210 This term is used byM. Bitter in the context of the disjuncture between economic and ecological
time: ‘Contradictions of the Commodity Carbon – On the Material and Symbolic Production
of a Market’ in E. Altvater and A. Brunnengra¨ber (eds), After Cancu´n (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fu¨r
Sozialwissenschaften, 2011) 89.
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